Texto 1 (Diógenes Laércio II 106, 9-12)

Ele [Euclides] declarava que o bem era um, embora designado por muitos nomes: ora sabedoria <φρόνησιν>, ora deus, outras vezes intelecto <νοῦν>, e assim por diante. Já os opostos do bem, eliminava-os, afirmando que não existiam.

Texto 2 (K. Döring, "The Students of Socrates", *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates*, p. 37)

The majority of current Socrates scholars agree that the philosophy of Socrates revolved around three convictions: (I) Those who leave according to virtue are happy. That is why there can be no more important activity for a man than to continually strive to realize a life of ethical virtue in all its aspects: justice, piety, and so forth. (II) Anybody who has achieved true knowledge of the good will, by necessity, do what is good. Thus, virtue is knowledge. (III) Hence, those who do what is bad do so only because they are mistaken, and erroneously assume the bad to be good. All three doctrines can be found in one or another form in the teachings of Euclides, as reported by Diogenes Laertius. The first doctrine is contained in the thesis that the good is one; the second in the thesis that insight and prudence are but different names for the good; and the third in the thesis that what is opposed to the good does not exist. This last claim must obviously be understood in a Socratic sense, which interprets the bad as a misconception of the good, and hence not as something real, but rather as a form of deprivation of the good.

Texto 3 (Eusébio de Cesareia, *Praeparatio evangelica* XIV 17 i; tradução E. H. Gifford)

But there came others uttering language opposed to these. For they think we ought to put down the senses and their presentations, and trust only to reason. For such were formerly the statements of Xenophanes and Parmenides and Zenon and Melissus, and afterwards of Stilpo and the Megarics. Whence these maintain that being is one, and that the other does not exist, and that nothing is generated, and nothing perishes, nor is moved at all.

Texto 4 (Diógenes Laércio II 107, 1-2)

Nas demonstrações [Euclides], não objectava às premissas, mas à conclusão.

Texto 5 (Aulo Gélio, *Noctes Atticae* VI 2, 1-13; tradução J. C. Rolfe)

They say that it is a rule of the dialectic art, that if there is inquiry and discussion of any subject, and you are called upon to answer a question which is asked, you should answer the question by a simple "yes" or "no." And those who do not observe that rule, but answer more than they were asked, or differently, are thought to be both uneducated and unobservant of the customs and laws of debate. As a matter of fact this dictum undoubtedly ought to be followed in very many debates. For a discussion will become endless and hopelessly involved unless it is confined to simple questions and answers. But there seem to be some discussions in which, if you answer what you are asked briefly and directly, you are caught in a trap. For if anyone should put a question in these words: "I ask you to tell me whether you have given up committing adultery or not," whichever way you answer according to this rule of debate, whether you say "yes" or "no," you will be caught in a dilemma, equally if you should say that you are an adulterer, or should deny it; for one who has not given up a thing has not of necessity ever done it. That then is a deceptive kind of catch-question, and can by no means lead to the inference and conclusion that he commits adultery who says that he has not given up doing it. But what will the defenders of that rule do in that dilemma, in which they must necessarily be caught, if they give a simple answer to the question? For if I should ask any one of them: "Do you, or do you not, have what you have not lost? I demand the answer 'yes' or no,'" whichever way he replies briefly, he will be caught. For if he says that he does not have what he has not lost, the conclusion will be drawn that he has no eyes, since he has not lost them; but if he says that he has it, it will be concluded that he has horns, because he has not lost them. Therefore it will be more cautious and more correct to reply as follows: "I have whatever I had, if I have not lost it." But an answer of that kind is not made in accordance with the rule which we have mentioned; for more is answered than was asked. Therefore this proviso also is commonly added to the rule, that one need not answer catchquestions.

(Cf. Diógenes Laércio VI 187, 5-7; Séneca, *Cartas a Lucílio* XLIX 8.)

Texto 6 (Aulo Gélio, *Noctes Atticae* XI 12, 1-3; tradução J. C. Rolfe)

Chrysippus asserts that every word is by nature ambiguous, since two or more things may be understood from the same word. But Diodorus, surnamed Cronus, says: "No word is ambiguous, and no one speaks or receives a word in two senses; and it ought not to seem to be said in any other sense than that which the speaker feels that he is giving to it. But when I," said he, "meant one thing and you have understood another, it may seem that I have spoken obscurely rather than ambiguously; for the nature of an ambiguous word should be such that he who speaks it expresses two or more meanings. But no man expresses two meanings who has felt that he is expressing but one."

Texto 7 (Cícero, *Academica priora* II xlvii 143; tradução J. S. Reid)

What a battle there is about the very question, which dialecticians expound in their elementary lessons, viz. how we are to decide whether a compound proposition of this form: 'if it is day, the sun shines,' is true or false! Diodorus has one view, Philo another, Chrysippus another.

Texto 8 (Boécio, *In librum Aristotelis de interpretatione libri duo* II 234; tradução S. Bobzien)

Possible is that which is capable of being true by the proposition's own nature (…). Necessary is that which is true, and which, as far as it is in itself, is not capable of being wrong. Non-necessary is that which, as far as it is in itself, is capable of being false, and impossible is that which by its own nature is not capable of being true.

Texto 9 (Boécio, *In librum Aristotelis de interpretatione libri duo* II 234-235; trad. S. Bobzien)

Possible is that which either is or will be [true]; impossible that which is false and will not be true; necessary that which is true and will not be false; non-necessary that which either is false already or will be false.

Texto 10 (Epicteto, *Dissertationes* II xix 1; tradução S. Bobzien)

The Master argument seems to have been developed from the following starting points. There is a general conflict between the following three [statements]: (I) every past true [proposition] is necessary; and (II) the impossible does not follow from the possible; and (III) something is possible which neither is true nor will be true. Being aware of this conflict, Diodorus used the plausibility of the first two [statements] in order to show that (IV) nothing is possible that neither is nor will be true.

Texto 11 (Epicteto, *Dissertationes* II xix 1; tradução P. E. Matheson)

Some one else, however, will maintain another pair of these propositions. 'What neither is nor will be true is yet possible', and, 'The impossible does not follow from the possible', while rejecting the third, 'Everything true in the past is necessary', as appears to be the view of Cleanthes and his school, who have been supported to a large extent by Antipater. Others maintain the third pair, 'What neither is true nor will be is yet possible', and 'Everything true as an event in the past is necessary', and reject 'The impossible does not follow from the possible'. But to maintain all three propositions at once is impracticable, because every pair is in conflict with the third. If, then, some one ask me, 'But which of these do you maintain?' I shall answer him that I do not know, but the account I have received is that Diodorus maintained one pair, and the school of Panthoides and Cleanthes, I fancy, the second, and the school of Chrysippus the third.

Texto 12 (Cícero, *De fato* 14; tradução S. Bobzien)

All true [propositions] of the past are necessary … since they are unalterable, i.e. since past [propositions] cannot change from true to false.

Texto 13 (Plutarco, *Adversus Colotem* 22-23, 1119c-1120b; tradução W. W. Goodwin)

Having done with Socrates and Plato, he next attacks Stilpo. Now as for those his true doctrines and good discourses, by which he managed and governed himself, his country, his friends, and such kings and princes as loved him and esteemed him, he has not written a

word; nor yet what prudence and magnanimity was in his heart, accompanied with meekness, moderation, and modesty. But having made mention of one of those little sentences he was wont in mirth and raillery to object against the sophists, he does, without alleging any reason against it or solving the subtlety of the objection, stir up a terrible tragedy against Stilpo, saying that the life of man is subverted by him, inasmuch as he affirms that one thing cannot be predicated of another. 'For how,' says he, 'shall we live, if we cannot style a man good, nor a man a captain, but must separately name a man a man, good good, and a captain a captain; nor can say ten thousand horsemen, or a fortified town, but only call horsemen horsemen, and ten thousand ten thousand, and so of the rest?' (...) But as for Stilpo, thus his argument stands. 'If of a man we predicate good, and of an horse running, the predicate or thing predicated is not the same with the subject or that of which it is predicated, but the essential definition of man is one, and of good another. And again, to be a horse differs from to be running. For being asked the definition of the one and of the other, we do not give the same for them both; and therefore those err who predicate the one of the other. For if good is the same with man, and to run the same with a horse, how is good affirmed also of food and medicine, and again (by Jupiter) to run of a lion and a dog? But if the predicate is different, then we do not rightly say that a man is good, and a horse runs.' Now if Stilpo is in this exorbitant and grossly mistaken, not admitting any copulation of such things as are in the subject, or affirmed of the subject, with the subject itself; but holding that every one of them, if it is not absolutely one and the same thing with that to which it happens or of which it is spoken, ought not to be spoken or affirmed of it – no, not even as an accident; it is nevertheless manifest, that he was only offended with some words, and opposed the usual and accustomed manner of speaking, and not that he overthrew man's life, and turned his affairs upside down.

Texto 14 (Diógenes Laércio II 119, 4-9; tradução R. D. Hicks)

Being a consummate master of controversy, he [Stilpo] used to demolish even the ideas <τὰ εἴδη>, and say that he who asserted the existence of man meant no individual; he did not mean this man or that. For why should he mean the one more than the other? Therefore neither does he mean this individual man. Again, vegetable is not what is shown to me, for vegetable existed ten thousand years ago. Therefore this is not vegetable.

Texto 15 (Teles fr. 7, 59.6-60.7 Hense; tradução R. Muller)

Comment ne serait-il pas déraisonnable et d'ailleurs vain, après la mort d'un être cher, de rester assis à pleurer, à s'affliger, à se détruire soi-même de surcroît ? Alors qu'il aurait fallu, pour paraître quelque peu plus philosophe au milieu de ceux qui ont perdu la raison, se désoler et pleurer alors que l'être cher ne fût mort, considérant que la personne qu'on aimait était née mortelle, qu'elle était un être humain. Car se n'est pas de quelqu'un qui raisonne bien, dit Stilpon, de négliger les vivants à cause des morts. L'agriculteur n'agit pas ainsi, et si un arbre s'est desséché, il ne coupe pas les autre de surcroît, mais il prend soin de ceux qui restent et essaie de compenser le profit espéré de l'arbre perdu. Nous n'agissons pas non plus de cette façon, avec les parties de notre corps : il serait ridicule, si on a perdu un oeil, de devoir en plus retrancher l'autre, si on a un pied déformé de devoir estropier l'autre aussi et si ont a perdu une dent de devoir arracher en outre toutes les autres ; si quelqu'un pensait qu'en pareils cas on doive agir ainsi, ce serait un sot. Si donc le fils ou l'épouse ont péri, n'est-il pas déraisonnable de ne plus prendre soin de soi-même alors qu'on est en vie et de détruire de surcroît ce que l'on a encore à sa disposition ?

Texto 16 (Teles fr. 3, 21.2-23.4 Hense; tradução R. Muller)

En réponse à celui qui estime que l'exil rend les hommes plus déraisonnables, il serait peut-être légitime de faire le parallèle avec ce qui se produit dans les arts : de même qu'on n'est pas plus mauvais joueur de flûte ou plus mauvais comédien lorsqu'on est en terre étrangère, de même n'y délibère-t-on pas plus mal. Par ailleurs, contre celui qui, d'un autre point de vue, juge que l'exil est quelque chose de nuisible, je crois bien qu'on ne peut que reprendre l'argumentation de Stilpon dont j'ai parlé tout à l'heure : "Que dis-tu, déclare-t-il ; de quels biens, de quelles catégories de biens l'exil prive-t-il ? Des biens de l'âme, de ceux du corps, des biens extérieurs ? L'exil prive-t-il du bon sens, de l'honnêteté, de la bonne conduite ? Certainement pas. Du courage peut-être, de la justice, ou d'une autre vertu ? Non plus. Serait-ce alors qu'il prive d'un bien du corps ? Mais jouir d'une bonne santé, être vigoureux, avoir une bonne vue ou une bonne ouïe, tout cela n'est il pas pareillement réalisable en terre étrangère, et même quelquefois mieux qu'en restant chez soi ? Assurément. Est-ce qu'enfin l'exil prive des biens extérieurs ? Mais beaucoup de gens n'ont-ils pas l'état de leur fortune devenir plus brillant après leur exil ? (...) De quel genre de biens, para conséquent, l'exil prive-t-il, ou à quel mal contribue-t-il ? Pour ma part, je n'en vois pas. En revanche, nous sommes souvent nous-mêmes les auteurs de notre propre ruine, aussi bien en exil qu'en restant chez nous."